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1 
 
Empathy translates the late-nineteenth-century German coinage 
of Einfühlung.1  Like empathy after it, Einfühlung arose in a part 
of empirical psychology that is no longer much cultivated, namely 
the psychology of aesthetic response.  This may seem odd.  But the 
fact that the German empirical psychologists of the late nineteenth 
century, who virtually founded the field, would have accorded 
much importance to the empirical, psychological side of aesthetics 
is actually not strange at all. 
 
 
2 
 
The underlying interest springs from the fact that the discourse of 
aesthetics played a central role in the constitution of modern 
German identity.  Aesthetics inform the emergence, trajectory, and 
legitimation of Germany’s state institutions as well as its system of 
education and culture.  The original formulation of aesthetics in 
Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, G. W. F.  Hegel, and others had 
been idealist.  The rise of a unified German state under Bismarck 
required that key concepts in what Marx would have been pleased 
to call “the German ideology” should be examined and justified 
objectively.  If possible, this was to be done by experimentation, 
but failing that by rigorous, methodical introspection.  (German 
empirical psychologists were as divided on this methodological 
question as their American heirs remain.)  At this time, German 
aesthetics took an empirical, even materialist turn. Empirical 
examination of the psychology of aesthetic response was widely 
cultivated, and it conferred great professional ethos on those 
psychologists who were taken to treat the subject insightfully. 
 
 
3 
 
Eventually the concept of empathy became residual in aesthetics.  
The waning of empathy as an aesthetic concept is what left this 
notion available for other uses, such as those related to 
psychotherapy and ethics.  If we ask why aesthetics turned away 
from empathy, it is tempting to see this as due, among other 
things, to the modern ist artistic movements that prized as artistic 
 
David Depew 100 Poroi, 4, 1, March, 2005 
effects alienation and defamiliarization rather than identification.  
It is also relevant that the Nazi state gave aesthetics as a whole, but 
especially on the moral and political side, a black eye.  A suspicion 
of aesthetics lurks, for example, in the writings of Jürgen 
Habermas.  He  particularly doubts a key theorem of German 
aesthetics that goes back to Schiller:  namely the notion that 
cultivating judgments of the beautiful and the sublime leads to 
moral sensitivity and political reform.2  Many take the Holocaust 
to have discredited that idea more or less completely, and with it 
any strong link between aesthetics and empathy.  Empathy, yes, we 
might say; aesthetics, no. 
 
4 
 
Einfühlung, the German word for empathy, literally means in-
feeling.  In its first use, in l873 by German psychologist Robert 
Vischer, Einfühlung names the placing of human feelings into 
inanimate things, plants, animals, or other humans in a specific 
way.  For the moment, at least, Einfühlung so fuses a human’s 
experience with an object’s experience that it no longer feels like 
the human’s own experience but instead like that of the object.  
Another German psychologist, Theodore Lipps, elaborated the idea 
around the turn of the century.  The main point of Lipps’s aesthetic 
psychology is to assert that those who think our own feelings or 
emotions are the object of aesthetic experience are wrong.  (The 
criticized view can be found in Tolstoy’s What is Art? – among 
many other places.3)   The object of aesthetic experience is the 
sensuous aesthetic object itself, which we contemplate from a 
suitable “aesthetic distance” or with the characteristically aesthetic 
“disinterest” of which Kant spoke.  Our own feeling states are not 
the object of aesthetic experience, argued Lipps, but merely the 
ground of their possibility.4   His reasons for this spring from what 
might be called introspectionist phenomenology. 
 
 
5 
 
Lipps forged the link between Einfühlung and empathy when, 
about l910, he gave empatheia as the Greek equivalent of 
Einfühlung.5  There was, to be sure, such a Greek word.  But it is 
late, not in common use, and not what we mean now by empathy.  
Empatheia named an intense passion or state of emotional 
undergoing.  Pathos comes from pathein:  to suffer or undergo.  
Plotinus, a late source, treats empatheia as the opposite of 
apathy.  This would oppose empatheia to the condition of 
emotional neutrality supposed by some philosophers – Plotinus 
not among them – to be the most desirable, even the definitive, 
philosophical state.6  So empatheia was no less technical a term 
than apatheia, its philosophical opposite. 
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6 
 
The prefix em and its equivalent en mean in.  For empatheia, this 
seems to mean being into one’s own pathic state of experience, of 
undergoing.  This is passion in the original, and New Testament, 
sense.  More weakly, it is the l960s counter-cultural sense of 
“being into” something.  In any case, it does not mean entering 
into the emotions of others, or more generally putting oneself in 
the position of another, as the current concept does.  Accordingly 
the  stipulative identification of Einfühlung with empatheia by 
Lipps might suggest that he did not know Greek well.  But his 
Greek was, in this instance at least, fine.  For he meant just what 
the late Greek term meant – an especially intense state of feeling – 
with the added inference that we experience feeling states this 
intense as belonging to an external object that occasions them.   
They are ek-static. 
 
 
7 
 
What about the English term empathy?  It came into the language 
through the influence of German empirical psychology in Great 
Britain and the United States.  (All early American psychologists, 
including William James, were educated in Germany.)  Thus E. B. 
Tichener, a German-trained psychologist writing in English, 
defined empathy as “the process of humanizing objects, of feeling 
ourselves or reading ourselves into them.”  He remarked, “I see 
gravity, modesty, courtesy, stateliness [in someone], but also feel 
them.  I suppose that’s a simple case of empathy, if we may coin 
the term as a rendering of Einfühlung.”7  That was in l909.  
Whether Tichener worked consciously from stipulative 
identification by Lipps of Einfuhlüng with empatheia, while 
disguising or forgetting that influence, I do not know.  But it is 
clear that the English aestheticist Vernon Lee, who was  influenced 
by Lipps, used empathy in connection with specifically aesthetic 
responses in her l912 book, Beauty and Ugliness and Other 
Studies in Psychological Aesthetics.  Perhaps she was following 
Tichener’s lead. 
 
 
8 
 
Curiously the Earl of Listowell (William Francis Hare), who 
championed and popularized the aesthetics of Lipps in England in 
the l920s, left the word untranslated.  He called his account of 
aesthetic response “The Theory of Einfühlung.”8  We may perhaps 
sense here the beginnings of a loosening of the connection between 
the English word empathy and its aesthetic roots.  The loosening 
might have been intensified by the first translation of Freud into 
English in the l920s.  Following the lead of Tichener and Lee, Alix 
and James Strachey used empathy to translate Freud’s 
Einfühlung.  Like Lipps’, Freud’s Einfühlung implied psychological 
projection.  But it was not specifically aesthetic.9  Perhaps it was by 
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way of this translation of Freud that empathy first entered into the 
psychoanalytical and, later, psychotherapeutic discourses that are 
the proximate roots of its current meaning.  (Beginning in the 
l960s, empathy began to disseminate itself widely into the general 
culture through the “client-centered therapy” of Carl Rogers and 
the related ideas of Hans Cohut.) 
 
9 
 
As tie to aesthetics weakened, the notion that empathy can be 
objectified into or projected onto every sort of object – whether 
inanimate, animate, or personal – we experience aesthetically (the 
joyous chirping of birds, the sadness of the willow tree, the 
sublimity of the stars) also began to dissipate.  By our own time, 
empathy comes to be restricted to what we “feel into” other people 
and maybe a few animals.  But here the theory of Einfühlung 
virtually turns itself on its head.  Originally the paradigmatic cases 
of empathy were inanimate objects, including “expressive” works 
of art.  Once psychotherapy and ethics captured the term, however, 
persons became paradigmatic.  With the exception of a few higher 
animals, mostly pets, persons seem now the exclusive objects of 
empathy.  With this change, comes another.   In the original 
theory, empathy acknowledges that the feelings we feel about 
others are actually our own; in the new meaning, empathy refers 
to our ability to identify with others by getting in contact with 
feelings that they have (although the ability to empathize in this 
sense might be stimulated by analogous experiences we have had). 
 
 
10 
 
To reflect on this reversal of meaning, we should recall that Lipps’ 
aesthetic Einfühlung, empatheia, or empathy was integral to “the 
expressivist turn” in aesthetics.  The vocabulary of expression and 
expressionism has been deposited into the common sense of 
modern languages by a sequence of more or less successful artistic 
movements.  It has become so pervasive and seemingly 
transparent that we fail to see that it was put in place not so long 
ago.  We fail to note that it helped self-consciously realistic, 
objectivistic psychologists like Lipps deny  that our finer feelings 
intimate or refer tacitly to a universal “feeling together” (sym-
pathy) among all things.  Lipps and company did not trace our 
creativity and aesthetic receptivity to such sympathy, nor did they 
explain artists as better attuned to it than the rest of us. 
 
 
11 
 
The “sympathetic” view explains aesthetic experience through 
recourse to philosophical idealism.  It holds that consciousness 
itself constitutes, in varying degrees, the very nature of whatever 
exists.  The sympathetic idealist argues that all nature affords 
appropriate, veridical objects of our feeling states – exactly to the 
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extent that everything is, to one degree or another, alive and that 
every living thing shows at least faint traces of mind.  By contrast, 
the philosophy of expression – the German word is Ausdruck – 
asserts different ways of accounting for aesthetic creativity and 
receptivity.  Expressive accounts do not presuppose, as did the 
hitherto dominant aesthetics of romanticism, that “nature may be 
really penetrable through and through by thought . . . that the 
stubborn opposition of subject and object which appears to vanish 
in the deepest sympathy may really be an illusion, and that in 
reality all people and things are one.”10   To connect empathy to 
the expressivist turn is thus to deny the reality of sympathy in the 
strong sense suggested the quoted formulation.  It is also to 
repudiate the radical, revolutionary politics of the romantic 
movement:  the politics of Schiller and Beethoven, who proclaimed 
that “ alle Menschen wërden Brüder.” 
 
12 
 
Romanticism taught that my aesthetic feeling not only is objective 
but is referentially the same feeling that exists in the object.  The 
feeling is literally shared.  In the eighteenth century, even before 
the romantics radicalized the term, one sympathized with 
someone or something.  One did not have sympathy for them. 
 
 
13 
 
At the outset of the twentieth century, though, a new generation of 
idealist philosophers came belatedly  to the defense of this 
romantic theory and with it the orientation of aesthetics toward 
the ultimate truth.  These later idealists coöpted expression from 
its psychologistic opponents.  I have in mind such thinkers as 
Benedetto Croce and Josiah Royce.  Both thought that rejecting the 
objective reference of aesthetic intuitions spelled something little 
short of nihilism.  They took seriously the claim that experiences of 
beauty and sublimity are propaideutic to morality.  So they tried to 
re-secure the objectivity of aesthetics by propounding, implausibly 
enough, a metaphysical idealism more radical than Hegel’s.  They 
asserted not a universal sympathy but a universal 
“expressiveness.” 
 
 
14 
 
The change in terminology was not without influence.  Even today 
so fine an interpreter of Hegel as Charles Taylor can propose to 
locate his late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century subject in 
an “expressivist culture.”  Thus he uses a term that, in its 
anachronism, brings much unwanted baggage with it.11  Having 
been displaced expression, sympathy began the long decline into 
its current, sentimental sense associated with Hallmark cards.  The 
older meaning of sympathy had been articulated by a succession of 
thinkers, ranging from Shaftsbury to Hegel, who were far more 
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insightful and politically radical than idealist epigones in the late 
nineteenth century. 
 
15 
 
What remains most fundamentally true, if overlooked, is that 
empathy was coined to replace or redefine sympathy.  The theory 
of art as expression (rather than intimation) was the vehicle for 
this deflation of sympathy into empathy.  We may see this process 
at work in Lipps, though he is far from alone among thinkers of his 
generation.  In summarizing the main points of his aesthetic 
theory at the outset of the second volume of his Die Aesthetische 
Beitrachtung und die Bildende Kunst, Lipps claims that the 
connection between Einfühlung and Ausdruck is definitional.  If 
there is to be a gap between an aesthetic object and its 
psychological ground, the aesthetic object must be an expression 
of the psychological ground. 
 
 
16 
 
The aesthetic object then amounts to an ex-pression, an out-
pressing, a squeezing out, as of grapes to make wine.  On this 
account, we press out our feelings onto external objects.  “In 
aesthetic experience,” Lipps  wrote, “a sensuous object distinct 
from me ‘expresses’ [ ausdruckt] something interior or soul-
like.”12  Thus we experience willows as sad, weeping.  But we must 
not mistake this for willows pressing their feelings into us.  From 
our perspective, that would be an im-pression:  an in-pressing like 
the type face printing onto a page or John Locke’s stylus of 
experience pressing into the blank slates of our minds.  In 
aesthetic experience, however, according to Lipps and company, 
we project our feelings onto willows.  Presumably we do this on the 
basis of schematic similarities – the drooping leaves, for example – 
that make willows “expressive” of our feelings.  For Lipps, 
aesthetic experience is a placing of our feelings into willows.  It 
does not refer, however obscurely, to any fact about the 
experiences of willow trees.  A fortiori it does not mean that we 
share the same feelings as the occasioning objects.  We, not the 
willows, feel sad. 
 
 
17 
 
Aside from idealists like Croce, virtually all of twentieth-century 
aesthetics taught that each human, whether as creator or 
perceiver,  brings his or her own feelings to the expressive object. 
The art object is merely a stimulus.13   It is not far from this 
perception to the notion, promoted by E. H. Gombrich, that art is 
illusion – in the same, projective sense that led Freud to declare 
religion an illusion.  In either case, individuals are locked within 
the small circles of their own feelings or experiences.  Some 
mediating remedy – call it communication – is called for, and 
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desperately, to heal the breach. 
 
18 
 
At times, Lipps did use the technical term Sympathie rather than 
the standard, non-technical German term Mitlied.  In this he 
explicitly echoed the British roots of “Sympathy.”  For example, he 
wrote, “Sympathy [ Sympathie] is nothing other than this, that . . . 
an ‘I-experience’ which is bound up for my consciousness with a 
distinct object gets ‘expressed’ [‘wrung out of me,’ in mich 
eindringt] and comes to be free of me.”14  But this is just to 
commandeer Sympathie as a synonym for what Lipps calls 
“positive” Einfühlung:  the Einfühlung that affirms life.15  This 
assimilation of sympathy to empathy did nothing to help reverse 
or slow the descent of sympathy from the sense of universal 
attunement and resonance in romanticism to the smarmy sense of 
pity and superiority that the term now connotes. 
 
 
19 
 
Does empathy share this fate?  Not exactly.  Like sympathy, 
empathy eventually became a residual, even rejected, concept in 
aesthetics.  As noted, it was thereupon taken up by what came to 
be called “humanistic psychology,” of which Rogerian 
psychotherapy is but one tendency.  From there, empathy has 
been re-inflated in recent decades into a universal ethic, perhaps 
because the Nazis exhibited so little of it.  
 
 
20 
 
Curiously enough, them, empathy’s current work closely 
resembles the work that sympathy was supposed to do in the 
heyday of romantic idealism, but no longer does.  Empathy is to 
bind us together – alle Menschen werden Brüder (und 
Schwestern) – in ways that Einfühlung originally was intended to 
dowse in a little cold water.   In its current meaning, empathy is a 
repair concept.  We use it to restore the sympathy that buoyed 
modernity in its salad days.  Conventionally we restrict this new 
empathy to the shared or mutually projected feelings of human 
beings, or those animals where we experience some resonance of  
human psychology.  Thus we free our sense of empathy from the 
metaphysical burdens that the earlier notion of sympathy seemed 
unable to bear.  Nevertheless questions about any grounding of 
empathy in the reality of an intersubjective relationship, potential 
or actual, remain to be clarified. 
 
 
 
 
 
© David Depew, 2005. 
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